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Abstract
Large-scale distributed systems often rely on replicated databases
that allow a programmer to request different data consistency guar-
antees for different operations, and thereby control their perfor-
mance. Using such databases is far from trivial: requesting stronger
consistency in too many places may hurt performance, and request-
ing it in too few places may violate correctness. To help program-
mers in this task, we propose the first proof rule for establishing
that a particular choice of consistency guarantees for various oper-
ations on a replicated database is enough to ensure the preservation
of a given data integrity invariant. Our rule is modular: it allows
reasoning about the behaviour of every operation separately under
some assumption on the behaviour of other operations. This leads
to simple reasoning, which we have automated in an SMT-based
tool. We present a nontrivial proof of soundness of our rule and
illustrate its use on several examples.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings
of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Pro-
grams
Keywords Replication; causal consistency; integrity invariants
1. Introduction
To achieve availability and scalability, many modern distributed
systems rely on replicated databases, which maintain multiple
replicas of shared data. Clients can access the data at any of the
replicas, and these replicas communicate changes to each other
using message passing. For example, large-scale Internet services
use data replicas in geographically distinct locations, and applica-
tions for mobile devices keep replicas locally to support offline use.
Ideally, we would like replicated databases to provide strong con-
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sistency, i.e., to behave as if a single centralised replica handles
all operations. However, achieving this ideal usually requires syn-
chronisation among replicas, which slows down the database and
even makes it unavailable if network connections between replicas
fail [2, 24].
For this reason, modern replicated databases often eschew syn-
chronisation completely; such databases are commonly dubbed
eventually consistent [47]. In these databases, a replica performs
an operation requested by a client locally without any synchronisa-
tion with other replicas and immediately returns to the client; the
effect of the operation is propagated to the other replicas only even-
tually. This may lead to anomalies—behaviours deviating from
strong consistency. One of them is illustrated in Figure 1(a). Here
Alice makes a post while connected to a replica r1, and Bob, also
connected to r1, sees the post and comments on it. After each of the
two operations, r1 sends a message to the other replicas in the sys-
tem with the update performed by the user. If the messages with the
updates by Alice and Bob arrive to another replica r2 out of order,
then Carol, connected to r2, may end up seeing Bob’s comment,
but not Alice’s post it pertains to. The consistency model of a repli-
cated database restricts the anomalies that it exhibits. For example,
the model of causal consistency [33], which we consider in this pa-
per, disallows the anomaly in Figure 1(a), yet can be implemented
without any synchronisation. The model ensures that all replicas in
the system see causally dependent events, such as the posts by Al-
ice and Bob, in the order in which they happened. However, causal
consistency allows different replicas to see causally independent
events as occurring in different orders. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1(b), where Alice and Bob concurrently make posts at r1 and
r2. Carol, connected to r3 initially sees Alice’s post, but not Bob’s,
and Dave, connected to r4, sees Bob’s post, but not Alice’s. This
outcome cannot be obtained by executing the operations in any to-
tal order and, hence, deviates from strong consistency.
Such anomalies related to the ordering of actions are often ac-
ceptable for applications. What is not acceptable is to violate cru-
cial well-formedness properties of application data, called integrity
invariants. Consistency models that do not require any synchroni-
sation are often too weak to ensure these. For example, consider a
toy banking application where the database stores the balance of a
single account that clients can make deposits to and withdrawals
from. In this case, an integrity invariant may require the account
balance to be always non-negative. Consider the database compu-
tation in Figure 1(c), allowed by causal consistency. Initially all



































σinit = 100, τ ⋈ τ(c)
withdraw(100):
{τ}, ✔
Figure 2. Examples illustrating Definition 1. We omit return values when they are ⊥ and token sets when they are empty.
to r1 and r2, both withdraw 100, thinking that there are sufficient
funds available. Once the two replicas exchange the updates, the
balance becomes −100, violating the integrity invariant. To ensure
the integrity invariant in this example, we have to introduce syn-
chronisation between replicas, and, since synchronisation is expen-
sive, we would like to introduce it sparingly. To allow this, some
research [9, 32, 42, 44] and commercial [6, 10, 35] databases now
provide hybrid consistency models that allow the programmer to
request stronger consistency for certain operations and thereby in-
troduce synchronisation. For example, a consistency model may
execute some operations under causal consistency, and some under
strong consistency [32]. To preserve the integrity invariant in our
banking application when using this model, only withdrawal op-
erations need to use strong consistency, and hence, synchronise to
ensure that the account is not overdrawn; deposit operations may
use causal consistency and hence proceed without synchronisation.
Requesting stronger consistency in hybrid models is similar to the
use of fences in weak memory models of shared-memory multipro-
cessors and programming languages [11] (see §7 for a comparison).
Even though hybrid consistency models allow the programmer
to fine-tune consistency level, using these models effectively is far
from trivial. Requesting stronger consistency in too many places
may hurt performance and availability, and requesting it in too few
places may violate correctness. Striking the right balance requires
the programmer to reason about the application behaviour on the
subtle semantics of the consistency model, understanding which
anomalies are disallowed by a particular consistency strengthen-
ing and whether disallowing these anomalies is enough to ensure
correctness. This difficulty is compounded by the perennial chal-
lenge of reasoning about concurrency, present even with strong
consistency—having to consider the huge number of possible in-
teractions between concurrently executing operations.
To help programmers exploit hybrid consistency models, we
propose the first proof rule and tool for proving integrity invariants
of applications using replicated databases with a range of hybrid
models. In more detail, our first contribution is a generic hybrid
consistency model (§2) that is flexible enough to encode a variety
of consistency models for replicated databases proposed in the lit-
erature [9, 32, 33, 42]. It guarantees causal consistency by default
and allows the programmer to additionally specify which pairs of
operations may not execute without synchronisation by means of a
special conflict relation. For example, to ensure the non-negativity
of balances in the banking application, the conflict relation may re-
quire any pair of withdrawals to synchronise, so that one of them
was aware of the effect of the other. This is equivalent to execut-
ing withdrawals under strong consistency. In general, different in-
stances of the conflict relation correspond to different interfaces
for strengthening consistency proposed in the literature. Our proof
rule is developed for the generic consistency model and, hence,
applies to existing models that can be represented as its instanti-
ations. We specify our consistency model formally (§3) using the
approach previously proposed for specifying variants of eventual
consistency [15]. In this approach, a database computation is de-
noted by a partial order on client operations, representing causality,
and the conflict relation imposes additional constraints on this or-
der.
Our next, and key, technical contribution is a proof rule for
showing that a set of operations preserves a given integrity invari-
ant when executed on our consistency model with a given choice of
conflict relation (§4). For example, we can prove that withdrawals
and deposits preserve the non-negativity of balances when executed
with the conflict relation described above. To avoid explicit reason-
ing about all possible interactions between operations, our proof
rule is modular: it allows us to reason about the behaviour of every
operation separately under some assumption on the behaviour of
other operations, which takes into account the conflict relation. In
this way, our proof rule allows the programmer to reason precisely
about how strengthening or weakening consistency of certain oper-
ations affects correctness.
The modular nature of our proof rule allows it to reason in
terms of states of a single database copy, just like in proof rules for
strongly consistent shared-memory concurrency. We have proved
that this simple reasoning is sound, despite the weakness of the
consistency model (§5). As part of this proof we have identified
a more general event-based rule that reasons directly in terms
of partial orders on events representing database computations,
instead of database states that these events lead to. The soundness
of the original state-based rule is proved by compiling it into the
event-based one. In this way, the event-based rule explicates the
reasons for the soundness of the state-based rule.
We have also developed a prototype tool that automates our
proof rule by reducing checking its obligations to SMT queries
(§6). Using the tool, we have verified several example applications
that require strengthening consistency in nontrivial ways. These
include an extension of the above banking application, an online
auction service and a course registration system. In particular, we
were able to handle applications using replicated data types (aka
CRDTs [40]), which encapsulate policies for automatically merg-
ing the effects of operations performed without synchronisation at
different replicas. The fact that we can reduce checking the correct-
ness properties of complex computations in our examples to query-
ing off-the-shelf SMT tools demonstrates the simplicity of reason-
ing required by our approach.
2. Consistency Model, Informally
We start by presenting our generic consistency model. Even though
this model is not implemented in its full generality by an existing
database, it can encode a variety of models that have in fact been
implemented. In this section we present the programming interface
of our consistency model and describe its semantics informally,
from an operational perspective. We give a formal semantics in §3.
2.1 Causal Consistency and Its Implementation
Our hybrid model guarantees at least causal consistency [33], al-
ready mentioned in §1. We therefore start by presenting informally
how a typical implementation of a causally consistent database op-
erates. Let State be the set of possible states of the data managed
by the database system. We denote states by σ and let σinit be a
distinguished initial state. Applications define a set of operations
Op = {o, . . .} on the data and interact with the database by issu-
ing these operations. For simplicity, we assume that an operation
always terminates and returns a single value from a set Val. We use
a value ⊥ ∈ Val to model operations that return no value. We do
not consider operation parameters, since these can be part of the
operation name.
The database implementation consists of a set of replicas, each
maintaining a complete copy of the database state; we identify the
replicas by r1, r2, . . . For the purposes of the informal explanation,
we assume that replicas never fail. A client operation is initially ex-
ecuted at a single replica, which we refer to as its origin replica. At
this replica, the execution of the operation is not interleaved with
that of others. This execution updates the replica state determinis-
tically, and immediately returns a value to the client. After this, the
replica sends a message to all other replicas containing the effect
of the operation, which describes the updates done by the opera-
tion to the database state. The replicas are guaranteed to receive the
message at most once. Upon receipt, the replicas apply the effect to
their state.
In this paper, we abstract from a particular language in which
operations may be written and assume that their semantics is given
by a function
F ∈ Op→ (State→ (Val× (State→ State))). (1)
To aid readability, for o ∈ Op we write Fo instead of F(o) and let
∀o, σ. Fo(σ) = (F valo (σ),F effo (σ)).
Given a state σ of o’s origin replica, F valo (σ) ∈ Val determines the
return value of the operation and F effo (σ) ∈ State → State its
effect. The latter is a function, to be applied by every replica to its
state to incorporate the operation’s effect: immediately at the origin
replica, and after receiving the corresponding message at all other
replicas.
For example, states in the toy banking application of §1 are
integers, representing the account balance: State = Z. We define
the semantics of operations for depositing an amount a > 0,
accruing a 5% interest and querying the balance:
Fdeposit(a)(σ) = (⊥, (λσ′. σ′ + a));
Finterest(σ) = (⊥, (λσ′. σ′ + 0.05 ∗ σ));



















Figure 3. (a) An illustration of a database computation; (b) the
corresponding execution of Definition 1. We assume σinit = 100.
where skip = (λσ′. σ′). Figure 3(a) illustrates a database compu-
tation involving these operations. Note that interest first computes
the interest 0.05 ∗σ based on the balance σ at the origin replica; its
effect then adds the resulting amount to the balance at each replica.
In particular, in Figure 3(a) interest at r2 does not take into account
the deposit made at r1. This behaviour is the price to pay for avoid-
ing synchronisation between replicas. The good news is that, once
the replicas r1 and r2 exchange the effects of deposit and interest,
they converge to the same balance, which is returned by the query
operations.
Such convergence is not guaranteed for arbitrary operations. For
example, we could implement interest so that its effect multiplied
the balance by 1.05 at each replica where it is applied:
F effinterest(σ) = (λσ′. (1.05 ∗ σ′)). (3)
In the scenario in Figure 3(a), this would lead the query operations
to return different values, 126 at r1 and 125 at r2. In this case,
even after all messages are delivered, replicas end up in different
states. This is undesirable for database users: we would like the
implementation to be convergent, i.e., such that two replicas that
see the same set of operations are in the same state. In particular,
if users stop performing updates to the database, then once all
outstanding messages are delivered, all replicas should reach the
same state [47]. To ensure convergence, for now we require that the
effects of all operations commute (we relax this condition slightly
in §2.2):
∀o1, o2, σ1, σ2. F effo1 (σ1) ◦ F
eff
o2 (σ2) = F
eff
o2 (σ2) ◦ F
eff
o1 (σ1). (4)
For example, this condition holds of the effects defined by (2). The
requirement of commutativity is not very taxing: as we elaborate
in §6, to satisfy (4), programmers can exploit ready-made repli-
cated data types (aka CRDTs [40]). These encapsulate commuta-
tive implementations of policies for merging concurrent updates to
the database.
As we explained in §1, asynchronous operation processing may
lead to anomalies, and causal consistency disallows some of them.
It ensures that message propagation between replicas is causal: if a
replica sends a message containing the effect of an operation o2
after it sends or receives a message containing the effect of an
operation o1, then no replica will receive the message about o2
before the it receives the one about o1. In this case we say that the
invocation of o2 causally depends on that of o1. Causal propagation
disallows the computation in Figure 1(a), but allows the one in
Figure 1(b).
2.2 Strengthening Consistency
The guarantees provided by causal consistency are too weak to
ensure certain integrity invariants. For example, in our banking
application we would like the state at each replica to satisfy the
invariant
I = {σ | σ ≥ 0}. (5)
To ensure this, an operation for withdrawing an amount a > 0
could check whether the account has sufficient funds and return X
Token = {τ}
./ = {(τ, τ)}
Fdeposit(a)(σ) = (⊥, (λσ′. σ′ + a), ∅)
Finterest(σ) = (⊥, (λσ′. σ′ + 0.05 ∗ σ), ∅)
Fquery(σ) = (σ, skip, ∅)
Fwithdraw(a)(σ) = if σ ≥ a then (X, (λσ′. σ′ − a), {τ})
else (7, skip, {τ})
Figure 4. Operation semantics for the banking application. Note
that a > 0.
or 7 depending on the result:
Fwithdraw(a)(σ) = if σ ≥ a then (X, (λσ′. σ′ − a)) else (7, skip).
This is enough to maintain the invariant when all operations are
processed at the same replica, but not when they are processed
asynchronously at different replicas. This is illustrated by the com-
putation in Figure 1(c), already explained in §1.
The problem in this example arises because two particular op-
erations update the database concurrently, without being aware of
each other. To address this, our consistency model allows the pro-
grammer to strengthen causal consistency by specifying explic-
itly which operations may not be executed in this way. Namely,
the model is parameterised by a token system T = (Token, ./),
consisting of a set of tokens Token and a symmetric conflict re-
lation ./ ⊆ Token × Token. Tokens are ranged over by τ and
their sets, by T . For sets T1 and T2 of tokens we let T1 ./ T2
if there exists a pair of conflicting tokens coming from these sets:
∃τ1 ∈ T1.∃τ2 ∈ T2. τ1 ./ τ2.
Each operation may acquire a set of tokens. To account for this,
we redefine the type of F in (1) as
F ∈ Op→ (State→ (Val× (State→ State)× P(Token)))
(6)
and let
∀o, σ.Fo(σ) = (F valo (σ),F effo (σ),F toko (σ)).
Thus, F toko (σ) ∈ P(Token) gives the set of tokens acquired by
the operation o when executed in the state σ. Informally, our con-
sistency model guarantees that operations that acquire tokens con-
flicting according to ./ have to be causally dependent one way or
another: the origin replica of one operation must have incorpo-
rated the effect of the other by the time the former operation ex-
ecutes. Ensuring this in implementations requires replicas to syn-
chronise [9, 32].
In our consistency model, we can guarantee the preservation of
invariant (5) in the banking application by defining operation se-
mantics as in Figure 4. Thus, withdraw acquires a token τ con-
flicting with itself, and all other operations do not acquire any to-
kens. Then the scenario in Figure 1(c) cannot happen: one with-
drawal would have to be aware of the other and would therefore
fail. However, deposits and interest accruals can be causally inde-
pendent with all operations, and replicas can therefore execute them
without any synchronisation [9, 32]. In this example, the token τ is
analogous to a mutual exclusion lock in shared-memory concur-
rency. Our proof method (§4) establishes that this use of the token
is indeed sufficient to preserve the integrity invariant (5).
Since operations acquiring conflicting tokens have to be
causally dependent, causal message propagation (§2.1) ensures that
all replicas see such operations in the same order. This allows us to
weaken (4) to require commutativity only for operations that do not
acquire conflicting tokens:
∀o1, o2, σ1, σ2. (F toko1 (σ1) ./ F
tok
o2 (σ2)) ∨
(F effo1 (σ1) ◦ F
eff
o2 (σ2) = F
eff
o2 (σ2) ◦ F
eff
o1 (σ1)). (7)
As we show in §3, this is sufficient to ensure the property of con-
vergence that we introduced in §2.1. For example, the operations
in Figure 4 satisfy (7). Furthermore, if all operations except query
acquired the token τ , then we would be able to implement interest
by the effect given by (3) without compromising convergence.
3. Formal Semantics
We now formally define the semantics of our consistency model,
i.e., the set of all client-database interactions it allows. To keep
the presentation as simple as possible, we define the semantics
declaratively: our formalism does not refer to implementation-level
concepts, such as replicas or messages, even though we do use
these concepts in informal explanations. We build on an approach
previously used to specify forms of eventual consistency [15].
Namely, our denotations of database computations consist of a
set of events, representing operation invocations by clients, and a
relation on events, describing abstractly how the database processes
the corresponding operations.
Assume a countably infinite set Event of events, ranged over
by e, f, g. A relation is a strict partial order if it is transitive and
irreflexive. For a relation R we write (e, f) ∈ R and e R−→ f
interchangeably.
DEFINITION 1. Given a token system T = (Token, ./), an execu-
tion is a tuple X = (E, oper, rval, tok, hb), where:
• E is a finite subset of Event;
• oper : E → Op gives the operation whose invocation a given
event denotes;
• rval : E → Val gives the return value of the operation;
• tok : E → P(Token) gives the set of tokens acquired by the
operation;
• hb ⊆ E × E, called happens-before, is a strict partial order
such that
∀e, f ∈ E. tok(e) ./ tok(f) =⇒ (e hb−→ f ∨ f hb−→ e). (8)
Operationally, each event represents an invocation of an opera-
tion at its origin replica. The applications of the operation’s effect at
other replicas are not recorded in an execution explicitly. Instead,
the happens-before relation records causal dependencies between
operations arising from such applications: e hb−→ f means that ei-
ther the operations denoted by e and f were executed at the same
replica in this order, or they were executed at different replicas and
the message containing the effect of e had been delivered to the
replica performing f before f was executed. Hence, if we have
e
hb−→ f , then the effect of e is incorporated into the state to which
f is applied and may influence its return value. We give examples of
executions in Figures 2 and 3(b). The ones in Figures 2(b) and 3(b)
model the computations of the database informally illustrated in
Figures 1(b) and 3(a), respectively.
The transitivity of hb in Definition 1 reflects the guarantee
of causal message propagation in implementations explained in
§2.1 [15]. For example, in the execution of Figure 2(a), the tran-
sitivity of hb mandates the edge between the addition of a post
and the query (cf. Figure 1(a)). The condition (8) formalises the
stronger consistency guarantee provided by tokens: operations ac-
quiring conflicting tokens have to be causally dependent. For ex-
ample, since the two withdraw operations in Figure 2(c) acquire a
token τ with τ ./ τ , they have to be related by happens-before.
Finally, we require executions to contain only finitely many events,
because in this paper we are only concerned with safety properties
of applications.
We write Exec(T ) for the set of all executions over the token
system T . In the following, we denote components of X and
similar structures as in X.E. We let Xinit be the unique execution
with Xinit.E = ∅.
We now define the semantics of our consistency model as the
set of all executions X ∈ Exec(T ) over a token system T whose
return valuesX.rval and token setsX.tok are computed usingF as
informally described in §2. To define this set, we first let the context
of an event e in an execution X be
ctxt(e,X) = (E, (X.oper)|E , (X.rval)|E , (X.tok)|E , (X.hb)|E),
where E = (X.hb)−1(e) and ·|E is the restriction to events in E.
Operationally-speaking, the context consists of those events whose
effects have been incorporated into the state of the replica where
the operation X.oper(e) executes; it is these events that influence
the outcomes of e—the return value X.rval(e) and the token set
X.tok(e). For example, the context of each of the query events in
Figure 3(b) consists of the deposit and interest events. This reflects
the events that the corresponding replica has seen before executing
query in Figure 3(a).
It is technically convenient for us to initially formulate
definitions without assuming effect commutativity (7). In this
case, X.rval(e) and X.tok(e) are not determined by ctxt(e,X)
uniquely. In operational terms, this is because the state that a replica
will be in after seeing the events in ctxt(e,X) depends on the order
in which the replica finds out about these events: although causal
message propagation ensures that messages about causally depen-
dent events in ctxt(e,X) will be delivered to the replica in the order
consistent with X.hb, messages about causally independent events
may be delivered in arbitrary order. We therefore first define a func-
tion
eval†F : Exec(T )→ P(State)
that yields the set of all possible states that a replica may end up
in after seeing the events in a given execution, such as ctxt(e,X).
For an execution Y , we define eval†F (Y ) inductively on the size of
Y.E. If Y.E = ∅, then eval†F (Y ) = {σinit}. Otherwise,
eval†F (Y ) = {F
eff
Y.oper(e)(σ
′)(σ) | e ∈ max(Y ) ∧
σ ∈ eval†F (Y |Y.E−{e}) ∧ σ
′ ∈ eval†F (ctxt(e, Y ))},
where
max(Y ) = {e ∈ Y.E | ¬∃f ∈ Y.E. (e, f) ∈ Y.hb}. (9)
Thus, to compute eval†F (Y ) for a non-empty Y , we choose an hb-
maximal event e in Y . Operationally, this is the event whose effect
is incorporated last by the replica r whose state we are determining.
We then pick a state σ that r could be in right before incorporating
the effect of e. The set of such states is obtained by invoking eval†F
on the execution Y |Y.E−{e}, describing the events r knew about
when it incorporated e. To determine the effect of e’s operation,
we pick a state σ′ that the replica r′ that generated e could be in
at the time of this generation. The set of such states is computed
by invoking eval†F on the execution ctxt(e, Y ), describing the
events that replica r′ knew about when it generated e. Then the
effect of e’s operation is F effY.oper(e)(σ′), and we determine the
state of the replica r after e by applying this effect to the state σ:
F effY.oper(e)(σ′)(σ).
To illustrate eval†F , consider the execution Y consisting of the
deposit and interest events in Figure 3(b) and the operation se-
mantics F in Figure 4. Recall that in this case σinit = 100. We
can evaluate Y in two ways, corresponding to the orders in which
replicas r1, respectively r2, apply the effects of the events in the
computation in Figure 3(a):




= {100 + 20 + 5, 100 + 5 + 20} = {125}.
Both ways of evaluation lead to the same outcome. This would not
be the case if we used a function F ′ identical to F , but with the
effect of interest defined by (3), which violates (7). In this case,
eval†F′(Y ) = {100 + 20 + 6, 100 + 5 + 20} = {126, 125},
which corresponds to the diverging database computation we ex-
plained in §2.1.
We note that, for notational convenience, eval†F takes as a pa-
rameter a whole execution including return values (rval) and token
sets (tok) associated with its events. However, the function as we
defined it does not depend on these: the state is determined solely
based on the operations performed (oper) and happens-before rela-
tionships among them (hb).
DEFINITION 2. An execution X ∈ Exec(T ) is consistent with T
and F , denoted X |= T ,F , if
∀e ∈ X.E. ∃σ ∈ eval†F (ctxt(e,X)).
(X.rval(e) = F valX.oper(e)(σ)) ∧ (X.tok(e) = F tokX.oper(e)(σ)).
We let Exec(T ,F) = {X | X |= T ,F} be the set of executions
allowed by our consistency model.
PROPOSITION 3.
∀X ∈ Exec(T ,F). ∀e ∈ X.E. (ctxt(e,X) ∈ Exec(T ,F)).
Operationally,X |= T ,F means that the outcomes inX can be
produced by the database implementation sketched in §2 with some
order of message delivery. The executions in Figures 2 and 3(b)
are consistent with the parameters in Figure 4 or the expected
semantics of operations on posts and comments. In particular, the
execution in Figure 2(c) is consistent because the context of the
right-hand-side withdraw includes the left-hand-side withdraw.
Evaluating this context yields a zero balance, which causes the
right-hand-side withdraw to generate skip as its effect.
LEMMA 4. If X |= T ,F , then eval†F (X) is a singleton set. Fur-
thermore, so is eval†F (ctxt(e,X)) for any e ∈ X.E.
The lemma shows that in Definition 2 it does not matter how
we choose the order of evaluation in eval†F . When viewed oper-
ationally, this independence implies the convergence property from
§2.1: two replicas that see the same events will end up in the same
state. The proof of Lemma 4, given in [26, §A], exploits proper-
ties (7) and (8). This proof is subtle because (7) does not require
commutativity for the effects of pairs of operations that acquire
conflicting tokens.
Motivated by Lemma 4, we define the evaluation of consistent
executions
evalF : Exec(T ,F)→ State
as follows: evalF (X) is the unique σ such that eval†F (X) = {σ}.
To illustrate the flexibility of our consistency model, we show
how it can represent some of the existing models; we provide more
instantiations in §6.
Causal consistency [16, 33] is the baseline model we obtain
without using any tokens: Token = ∅ and ∀o, σ.F toko (σ) = ∅.
Then (8) is a tautology and (7) is equivalent to (4), so that all effects
have to commute.
Sequential consistency [29] is a form of strong consistency and
the strongest consistency model we can obtain from ours. It re-
quires every operation to acquire a mutual exclusion token:
Token = {τ}; ./ = {(τ, τ)}; ∀o, σ.F toko (σ) = {τ}.
Then in any execution X ∈ Exec((Token, ./),F), the happens-
before X.hb is total, and each event in X is aware of the effects of
all events preceding it in X.hb.
RedBlue consistency [32] is a hybrid consistency model that
classifies operations as either red or blue: Op = Opr ] Opb.
Red operations are guaranteed sequential consistency, and blue
operations, only causal consistency. To express this in our model,
we again use a mutual exclusion token: Token = {τ} and ./ =
{(τ, τ)}. Red operations acquire τ , and blue operations acquire no
tokens:
(∀o ∈ Opr. ∀σ.F
tok
o (σ) = {τ}) ∧ (∀o ∈ Opb.∀σ.F
tok
o (σ) = ∅).
Then red operations are totally ordered by happens-before, and blue
ones are ordered only partially. The token assignment in our bank-
ing application (Figure 4) is an instance of the RedBlue consis-
tency, where withdraw operations are red, and all others are blue.
Our framework cannot express some of common consistency
models, such as prefix consistency [43], which is stronger than
causal consistency. However, the framework could be adjusted to
assume prefix consistency as a baseline following [17].
4. State-based Proof Rule
We consider the following verification problem: given a token
system T = (Token, ./), prove that operations F maintain an
integrity invariant I ⊆ State over database states. Formally, we
establish that any execution consistent with T and F evaluates to a
state satisfying I:
Exec(T ,F) ⊆ eval−1F (I).
By Proposition 3 this implies that the return value of every event
in an execution X ∈ Exec(T ,F) can be obtained by applying its
operation to a state satisfying I:
∀e ∈ X.E. ∃σ ∈ I. (X.rval(e) = F valX.oper(e)(σ)).
For example, we show that any execution consistent with Fig-
ure 4 evaluates to a state satisfying the invariant (5). Hence, a query
operation will always return a non-negative balance.
The key challenge of the above verification problem is the
need to consider infinitely many executions consistent with T and
F . Our main technical contribution is the proof rule for solving
this problem that avoids considering all such executions explicitly.
Instead, the proof rule is modular in that it allows us to reason
about the behaviour of every operation separately. Our proof rule
is also state-based in that it reasons in terms of states obtained by
evaluating parts of executions or, from the operational perspective,
in terms of replica states.
We give our proof rule in Figure 5 and explain it from the op-
erational perspective. The rule assumes that the invariant I holds
of the initial database state σinit (condition S1). Consider a compu-
tation of the database implementation from §2 and a state σ of a
replica r at some point in this computation. The proof rule assumes
that σ ∈ I and aims to establish that executing any operation o at r
will preserve the invariant I . This is easy if we only consider how
o’s effect changes the state of r, since this effect is applied to the
state σ where it was generated:
∀σ. (σ ∈ I =⇒ F effo (σ)(σ) ∈ I). (10)
The difficulty comes from the need to consider how o’s effect
changes the state of any other replica r′ that receives it; see Fig-
∃G0 ∈ P(State× State), G ∈ Token→ P(State× State)
such that
S1. σinit ∈ I
S2. G0(I) ⊆ I ∧ ∀τ. G(τ)(I) ⊆ I
S3. ∀o, σ, σ′. (σ ∈ I ∧ (σ, σ′) ∈ (G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥))∗)
=⇒ (σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) ∈ G0 ∪G(F toko (σ))
Exec(T ,F) ⊆ eval−1F (I)
Figure 5. State-based proof rule for a token system T =
(Token, ./). For T ⊆ Token we let G(T ) =
⋃
τ∈T G(τ) and
T⊥ = {τ | τ ∈ Token ∧ ¬∃τ ′ ∈ T. τ ./ τ ′}. We denote by R∗
the reflexive and transitive closure of a relation R. For a relation
R ∈ P(A × B) and a predicate P ∈ P(A), the expression R(P )











Figure 6. Graphical illustrations of (a) the state-based rule; and (b)
the event-based rule.
ure 6(a). At the time of the receipt, r′ may be in a different state
σ′, due to operations executed at r′ concurrently with o. We can
show that it is sound to assume that this state σ′ also satisfies the
invariant. Thus, to check that the operation o preserves the invariant
when applied at any replica, it is sufficient to ensure
∀σ, σ′. (σ, σ′ ∈ I =⇒ F effo (σ)(σ′) ∈ I). (11)
However, establishing this without knowing anything about the re-
lationship between σ and σ′ is a tall order. In the bank account
example, both σ = 100 and σ′ = 0 satisfy the integrity invari-
ant (5). Then F effwithdraw(100)(σ)(σ′) = −100, which violates the
invariant. Condition (11) fails in this case because it does not take
into account the tokens acquired by withdraw.
The proof rule in Figure 5 addresses the weakness of (11) by al-
lowing us to assume a certain relationship between the state where
an operation is generated (σ) and where its effect is applied (σ′),
which takes into account the tokens acquired by the operation. To
express this assumption, the rule uses a form of rely-guarantee rea-
soning [27]. Namely, it requires us to associate each token τ with a
guarantee relation G(τ), describing all possible state changes that
an operation acquiring τ can cause. Crucially, this includes not only
the changes that the operation can cause on the state of its origin
replica, but also any change that its effect causes at any other replica
it is propagated to. We also have a guarantee relationG0, describing
the changes that can be performed by an operation without acquir-
ing any tokens. Condition S2 requires the guarantees to preserve
the invariant.
Like (11), condition S3 considers an arbitrary state σ of o’s
origin replica r, assumed to satisfy the invariant I . The condition
then considers any state σ′ of another replica r′ to which the effect
of o is propagated. The conclusion of S3 requires us to prove that
applying the effectF effo (σ) of the operation o to the state σ′ satisfies
the union of the guarantees associated with the tokens F toko (σ) that
the operation o acquires. By S2, this implies that the effect of the
operation preserves the invariant. Condition S3 further allows us
to assume that the state σ′ of r′ can be obtained from the state
σ of r by applying a finite number of changes allowed by G0 or
the guarantees for those tokens that do not conflict with any of
the tokens acquired by the operation o, i.e., G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥).
Informally, acquiring a token denies other replicas permissions to
concurrently perform changes that require conflicting tokens.
We now use our proof rule to show that the operations in the
banking application (Figure 4) preserve the integrity invariant (5).
We assume that the initial state σinit satisfies the invariant. The
guarantees are as follows:
G(τ) = {(σ, σ′) | 0 ≤ σ′ < σ};
G0 = {(σ, σ′) | 0 ≤ σ ≤ σ′}.
(12)
Since withdrawals acquire the token τ , the guarantee G(τ) for this
token allows decreasing the balance without turning it negative;
the guarantee G0 allows increasing a non-negative balance. Then
condition S2 is satisfied. We show how to check the condition S3
in the most interesting case of o = withdraw(a). Consider σ and
σ′ satisfying the premiss of S3:
σ ∈ I ∧ (σ, σ′) ∈ (G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥))∗.
Since F toko (σ) = {τ}, we have that (F toko (σ))⊥ = ∅. Thus,
(σ, σ′) ∈ G∗0. This and σ ∈ I imply that
0 ≤ σ ≤ σ′. (13)
If σ < a, then F effo (σ)(σ′) = σ′. Furthermore, σ′ ≥ 0 by
(13). Thus, (σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) = (σ′, σ′) ∈ G0, which implies the
conclusion of S3.
If σ ≥ a, then F effo (σ)(σ′) = σ′− a. Since σ ≤ σ′, by (13) we
have σ′ ≥ a. Thus, (σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) = (σ′, σ′ − a) ∈ G({τ}),
which implies the conclusion of S3. Operationally, in this case
our proof rule establishes that, if there was enough money in the
account at the replica where the withdrawal was made, then there
will be enough money at any replica the withdrawal is delivered to.
This completes the proof of our example.
In a banking application with multiple accounts, we could en-
sure non-negativity of balances by associating every account c with
a token τc such that τc ./ τc, but τc 6./ τc′ for another account
c′. Thus, withdrawals from the same account would have to syn-
chronise, while withdrawals from different accounts could proceed
without synchronisation. Our proof rule easily deals with this gen-
eralisation by associating every token τc with a guarantee describ-
ing the changes to the corresponding account. As we elaborate in
§6, the banking application we verify with the aid of our tool allows
multiple accounts. There we also provide more complex examples
of using our proof rule. For now, it is instructive to see how the
proof rule is specialised for some of the simpler instantiations of
our consistency model from §3.
Sequential consistency. Recall that for sequential consistency,
./ = {(τ, τ)} and we always have F toko (σ) = {τ}, so that
(F toko (σ))⊥ = ∅. Let G0 = ∅, so that we always have σ = σ′
in S3. Then S2 and S3 require us to find G(τ) such that
G(τ)(I) ⊆ I ∧ ∀o, σ. (σ ∈ I =⇒ (σ,F effo (σ)(σ)) ∈ G(τ)).
It is easy to show that we can find such a G(τ) if and only if (10)
holds for all o. Thus, in this case it is sufficient to check that the
effect of an operation preserves the invariant when applied to the












(b) σinit = 100
query:
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Figure 7. Executions illustrating the unsoundness of the state-
based proof rule on weaker consistency models.
Causal consistency. We have Token = ∅ and the conditions S2
and S3 become equivalent to
G0(I) ⊆ I ∧ (∀o, σ, σ′. (σ ∈ I ∧ (σ, σ′) ∈ G∗0)
=⇒ (σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) ∈ G0).
In this case the effects of all operations are described by a single
guarantee relation G0. We need to show that every operation satis-
fies this guarantee while assuming that concurrently executing op-
erations at other replicas do. Note that (11), for all o, is a special
case of the above obligation for G0 = I × I . Thus, (11) is an
invariant-based version of the above rely-guarantee proof rule.
As we elaborate in §7, our proof rule bears a lot of similar-
ity to proof rules for strongly consistent shared-memory concur-
rency [21, 27, 36]. The reasons for the soundness of our proof in the
setting of weak consistency are subtle. Its soundness relies crucially
on the fact that our consistency model guarantees at least causal
consistency and on the commutativity of operation effects (7). For
example, some consistency models do not guarantee the transitiv-
ity of happens-before [8, 47] and thus allow the execution in Fig-
ure 7(a), which uses the operations in Figure 4. Here a withdrawal
hb-follows a deposit; a query sees only the withdrawal, thus vio-
lating the integrity invariant (5). Since we have proved these op-
erations to preserve the invariant using our proof rule, this rule is
unsound over a consistency model allowing the execution in Fig-
ure 7(a). We note that the obligation (11), for all o, establishes the
invariant I even for a consistency model where hb is only acyclic,
but not necessarily transitive.
To illustrate that our rule becomes unsound if we drop the re-
quirement of effect commutativity (7), consider the operations in
Figure 4, but with the effect of interest defined by (3). It is easy
to show that the premiss of the rule holds for the invariant (5) even
with this change. At the same time, the execution in Figure 7(b)
violates the invariant, yet is consistent with the operations in Fig-
ure 4 according to Definition 2. This is because the evaluation de-
termining the effect of withdraw(126) can order deposit(20) be-
fore interest, whereas the evaluation determining the outcome of
query can order these operations the other way round, resulting in
a smaller balance. Again, the obligation (11) establishes the invari-
ant even without (7): it ensures
∀X ∈ Exec(T ,F). eval†F (X) ⊆ I.
5. Event-based Proof Rule and Soundness
We now prove the soundness of the state-based proof rule. To this
end, we present an event-based proof rule (Figure 8), from which
the state-based one is derived. This event-based rule highlights the
reasons for the soundness of the state-based one. Instead of rea-
soning about replica states, the event-based rule reasons about ex-
ecutions describing the events that replicas know about; the eval-
uation of the corresponding effects yields the replica states in the
state-based rule. In particular, we specify the desired integrity in-
variant as a predicate on executions: I ⊆ Exec(T ). The event-
∃G ∈ P(Exec(T )× Exec(T )) such that
E1. Xinit ∈ I
E2. G(I) ⊆ I
E3. ∀X,X ′, X ′′. ∀e ∈ X ′′.E.
(X ∈ I ∧X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e} ∧X ′′ ∈ Exec(T ,F) ∧
e ∈ max(X ′′) ∧X = ctxt(e,X ′′) ∧ (X,X ′) ∈ G∗)
=⇒ (X ′, X ′′) ∈ G
Exec(T ,F) ⊆ I
Figure 8. Event-based proof rule.
based rule establishes that any execution consistent with given
T = (Token, ./) and F belongs to I: Exec(T ,F) ⊆ I.
As before, we explain the event-based rule from the operational
perspective. The rule again uses rely-guarantee reasoning, but with
the guarantee G represented by a relation on executions. The guar-
antee describes the change to a replica’s knowledge brought on by
the replica executing a new operation or receiving the effect of an
operation originally executed elsewhere.
Conditions E1 and E2 are similar to S1 and S2: E1 requires
the invariant I to allow an empty execution Xinit (§3), which eval-
uates to the initial database state σinit; E2 requires the guarantee
to preserve the invariant. Condition E3 is graphically illustrated in
Figure 6(b). Similarly to S3, the condition E3 considers any op-
eration, denoted by an event e, and checks that the change to the
database state made by the operation satisfies the guarantee. This
check is done not only at the origin replica r of e, but also at any
other replica r′ that receives its effect. The execution X can be
thought of as describing the events known to the replica r when
it executed the operation denoted by e. We assume that the ex-
ecution X satisfies the invariant I. The execution X ′ describes
the events known to the replica r′ just before it receives the ef-
fect of e; X ′′ describes the events known to r′ after this, so that
X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e}. The execution X ′′ is consistent with T and
F ; the conditions in the proof rule imply that so areX andX ′. The
condition e ∈ max(X ′′) (see (9)) reflects the fact that e is the latest
event received by r′. The condition X = ctxt(e,X ′′) ensures that
X is a part of X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e}. This reflects the guarantee of
causal message propagation: when r′ receives the effect of e, this
replica is guaranteed to know about all the events that the replica r
knew about when it executed e.
Even though the rule allows us to assume that X is part of X ′,
the latter may contain additional events that the replica r′ found
out about by the time it received the effect of e. The rule allows
us to assume that the changes in the knowledge of r′ brought
on by adding these events satisfy the guarantee: (X,X ′) ∈ G∗.
In exchange, the rule requires us to ensure that adding the event
e to the knowledge of replica r′ will also satisfy the guarantee:
(X ′, X ′′) ∈ G.
In the following, we use the fact that the premiss of the impli-
cation in E3 entails that all events in X ′.E − X.E are causally
independent with e.
PROPOSITION 5. For all X,X ′, X ′′ and e ∈ X ′′.E,
(X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e} ∧ e ∈ max(X ′′) ∧X = ctxt(e,X ′′))
=⇒ ¬∃f ∈ (X ′.E −X.E). (e X
′′.hb−−−−→ f ∨ f X
′′.hb−−−−→ e).
PROOF. Consider f ∈ (X ′.E −X.E). Since e ∈ max(X ′′), we
cannot have e X
′′.hb−−−−→ f . If f X
′′.hb−−−−→ e, then f ∈ X.E due to
X = ctxt(e,X ′′). But this contradicts f ∈ (X ′.E −X.E). ut
We now give the proof of soundness of the event-based rule and
sketch the derivation of the state-based one (we give a full proof of
the latter in [26, §A]).
Let v be the following partial order on executions:
X v X ′ ⇐⇒ (X = X ′|X.E ∧ ((X ′.hb)−1)(X.E) ⊆ X.E).
(14)
When X v X ′, we say that X is a causal cut of X ′; any event
is included into X together with its causal dependencies in X ′.
Operationally, X v X ′ means that X and X ′ can describe the
knowledge of a replica at different points in the same database
computation.
PROPOSITION 6.
∀X ∈ Exec(T ,F).∀Y. (Y v X =⇒ Y ∈ Exec(T ,F)).
THEOREM 7. The event-based proof rule in Figure 8 is sound.
PROOF. Assume E1-E3 hold. We prove that
∀X ′′ ∈ Exec(T ,F).∀Y. (Y v X ′′ =⇒ (Y,X ′′) ∈ G∗), (15)
i.e., that the guarantee G allows us to transition into a consistent
executionX ′′ from any of its causal cuts Y . The desired conclusion
Exec(T ,F) ⊆ I follows from (15): it implies (Xinit, X ′′) ∈ G∗,
but Xinit ∈ I (E1) and G preserves I (E2).
The proof of (15) is done by induction on the size of X ′′.
In the base case, we must have Y = X ′′ = Xinit, which im-
plies (Y,X ′′) ∈ G∗. In the induction step, we consider X ′′ ∈
Exec(T ,F) and Y v X ′′ such that Y 6= X ′′. We pick an event
e ∈ (X ′′.E − Y.E) such that e ∈ max(X ′′) and define X and X ′
as in E3:
X = ctxt(e,X ′′) ∧X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e}.
Then
Y v X ′ ∧X v X ′. (16)
By Proposition 6 we have X,X ′ ∈ Exec(T ,F). Thus, we can
apply the induction hypothesis to X ′ and its causal cuts X and Y ,
as well as to X and its causal cut Xinit, getting:
(Y,X ′) ∈ G∗ ∧ (X,X ′) ∈ G∗ ∧ (Xinit, X) ∈ G∗.
By E1 and E2, (Xinit, X) ∈ G∗ implies X ∈ I. Together with
(X,X ′) ∈ G∗, this allows us to apply E3 and obtain (X ′, X ′′) ∈
G. This and (Y,X ′) ∈ G∗ imply (Y,X ′′) ∈ G∗, as required. ut
In operational terms, the statement (15) established in the proof
ensures that any sequence of changes in the knowledge of a replica
during a database computation is described by G∗. The above proof
relies crucially on the fact that our consistency model guarantees
at least causal consistency. For example, in (16) we can deduce
X v X ′ from X = ctxt(e,X ′′) because happens-before is
transitive.
COROLLARY 8. The state-based proof rule in Figure 5 is sound.
PROOF SKETCH. Assume a state-based invariant I ⊆ State. We
construct the corresponding event-based invariant I as the set of all
executions that evaluate to a state in I: I = eval−1F (I). Then the
conclusion Exec(T ,F) ⊆ I of the event-based rule implies the
conclusion Exec(T ,F) ⊆ eval−1F (I) of the state-based rule.
We now show that the premiss of the state-based rule implies
that of the event-based rule. Assume state-based guaranteesG0 and
G that satisfy S1-S3. We construct the corresponding event-based
guarantee G by describing the change to the knowledge of a replica
brought on by incorporating the effect of an operation satisfying
the state-based guarantees G0 and G:
G = {(X,Y ) | ∃e. (Y.E −X.E) = {e} ∧X v Y ∧
(evalF (X), evalF (Y )) ∈ G0 ∪G(Y.tok(e))}. (17)
Thus, the guarantee G consists of pairs (X,Y ), where Y extends
X by a single event e representing the operation, and the two
executions evaluate to a pair of states inG0 orG(τ) for some token
τ acquired by e.
It remains to prove that the event-based guarantee G satisfies
conditions E1-E3. Conditions E1 and E2 trivially follow from con-
ditions S1 and S2; we thus only need to show that S3 implies E3.
Assume that for some X,X ′, X ′′ and e ∈ X ′′.E, the premiss of
E3 holds:
X ∈ I ∧X ′ = X ′′|X′′.E−{e} ∧X ′′ ∈ Exec(T ,F) ∧
e ∈ max(X ′′) ∧X = ctxt(e,X ′′) ∧ (X,X ′) ∈ G∗. (18)
Let σ = evalF (X), σ′ = evalF (X ′) and o = X ′′.oper(e). We
now show that the premiss of S3 holds:
σ ∈ I ∧ (σ, σ′) ∈ (G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥))∗. (19)
First of all, σ ∈ I follows from X ∈ I by the definition of I.
Furthermore, by Proposition 5, all events in (X ′.E − X.E) are
unrelated to e in (X ′′.hb ∪ (X ′′.hb)−1). But then by (8), they
cannot acquire tokens that conflict with the ones acquired by e:
∀f ∈ (X ′.E −X.E).¬(X ′′.tok(e) ./ X ′′.tok(f)).
Using this fact, (X,X ′) ∈ G∗ given by (18) and the definition of
G given by (17), we can show that
(σ, σ′) = (evalF (X), evalF (X
′)) ∈ (G0 ∪G((X ′′.tok(e))⊥))∗
= (G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥))∗,
thus establishing (19). Then the conclusion of S3 yields
(σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) ∈ G0 ∪G(F toko (σ)), so that
(evalF (X
′), evalF (X
′′)) = (σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′))
∈ G0 ∪G(F toko (σ))
= G0 ∪G(X ′′.tok(e)).
(20)
This implies the conclusion of E3: (X ′, X ′′) ∈ G. ut
The above proof relies crucially on Lemma 4, which allows us
to define evalF . The lemma guarantees that, when evaluating exe-
cutions, choosing different orders for causally independent events
does not affect the resulting state. In (20) this allows us to choose a
particular convenient order of evaluating X ′′ that applies the oper-
ation o last. Lemma 4 holds due to the commutativity condition (7),
and this illustrates the importance of this condition for the sound-
ness of the state-based rule.
6. Examples and Automation
We have developed a prototype tool that automates the state-based
proof rule by reducing its obligations to SMT queries. Using the
tool, we have verified three applications: an extended version of
the banking application in Figure 4, an auction service and a course
registration system. Our results are summarised in Figure 9. In
the following, we first show more sophisticated uses of our proof
rule using fragments of the auction and courseware applications,
as well as the consistency model of parallel snapshot isolation [38,
42]. We then present our automation approach and the complete
applications that we verified.
6.1 Auction service
Figure 10 shows a fragment of an auction application. An auction
can be either open or closed. While the auction is open, a client can
place a bid with the amount b using the place(b) operation. A client
can also close the auction at any time using the close operation,
which declares the winner. Finally, clients can query the database
state using query.
Application # ops # tokens # invariants time (ms)
Banking 5 1 1 385
Auction 14 9 12 5297
Courseware 5 5 2 512
Figure 9. Characteristics of the applications verified and the time
taken by the tool. The numbers of operations are given ignoring op-
eration parameters. The numbers of tokens are similarly given with-
out taking into account tokens associated with different instances of
the same object, such as different bank accounts. The tool was run
on a Mac Mini, 3 GHz Intel Core i7.
State = P(N)× (N ∪ {⊥})
σinit = (∅,⊥)
I = {(B,w) | w 6= ⊥ =⇒ B 6= ∅ ∧ w = max(B)}
Token = {τc, τp}
./ = {(τc, τc), (τc, τp), (τp, τc)}
Fplace(b)((B,w)) = if w 6= ⊥ then (7, skip, {τp})
else (X, (λ(B′, w′). (B′ ∪ {b}, w′)), {τp})
Fclose((B,w)) = if (w 6= ⊥ ∨B = ∅) then (7, skip, {τc})
else (X, (λ(B′, w′). (B′,max(B))), {τc})
Fquery((B,w)) = ((B,w), skip, ∅)
Figure 10. A fragment of an auction application.
The database state is of the form (B,w). HereB consists of the
amounts of the bids placed; for simplicity, we do not distinguish
two bids with the same amount. The component w is either ⊥,
signifying that the auction is still open, or the winning bid. A
successful place(b) operation has the effect of adding b to B. The
close operation writes the winning bid into w. Note that the effects
of two close operations do not commute. To satisfy (7), and to
ensure that clients can only close the auction once, we let close
operations acquire a token τc such that τc ./ τc.
The integrity invariant I we would like to maintain in the
courseware application is that, if the auction is closed, then the win-
ning bid is the maximal of all the bids placed. Without using any
other tokens than τc, this invariant can be violated: Alice can close
the auction and declare the winner, e.g., 100, without being aware
of a higher bid 105 placed concurrently by Bob. A query aware of
both operations will return the bid set containing 105 and 100 but
mark 100 as the winning bid in the set.
To preserve the invariant in the RedBlue consistency model
(§3), we would have to use strong consistency for both place and
close operations, i.e., let them acquire the mutually exclusive token
τc. To address this inefficiency, Balegas et al. [9] proposed a hybrid
model where consistency can be strengthened using multi-level
locks, analogous to readers-writer locks from shared memory. In
our example, we represent such a lock by a pair of tokens: τc,
introduced before, and τp. Each close operation acquires τc, and
each place operation, τp. We have τc ./ τp. Hence, for every pair of
close and place(b) operations, either close is aware of the bid b and
takes it into account when computing the winner, or the place(b)
operation is aware that the auction has been closed and, hence, does
not place the bid. However, we do not have τp ./ τp and, hence,
bid placements can be causally independent. In our analogy with
a readers-writer lock, bid placements play the role of readers and
closing the auction, the role of a writer.
Balegas et al. [9] show how to implement multi-level locks so
that a replica can place a bid without any synchronisation; only an
operation closing the auction has to synchronise with other replicas
State = P(Student)×RWset(Course)×P(Student×Course)
σinit = (∅, ∅RWset, ∅)
I = {(S,C,E) | E ⊆ P(S × contents(C))}
Token = {τe(c), τr(c) | c ∈ Course}
./ = {(τe(c), τr(c)), (τr(c), τe(c)) | c ∈ Course}
Fregister(s)((S,C,E)) =
(⊥, (λ(S′, C′, E′). (S′ ∪ {s}, C′, E′)), ∅)
FaddCourse(c)((S,C,E)) =
(⊥, (λ(S′, C′, E′). (S′, add(c, C′), E′)), ∅)
Fenroll(s,c)((S,C,E)) =
if (s 6∈ S ∨ c 6∈ contents(C)) then (7, skip, {τe(c)})
else (X, (λ(S′, C′, E′). (S′, C′, E′ ∪ {(s, c)})), {τe(c)})
FremCourse(c)((S,C,E)) =
if (c 6∈ contents(C) ∨ ∃s. (s, c) ∈ E)) then (7, skip, {τr(c)})
else (X, (λ(S′, C′, E′). (S′, remove(c, C′), E′)), {τr(c)})
Fquery((S,C,E)) = ((S, contents(C), E), skip, ∅)
RWset(Course) = P(Course)× P(Course)
∅RWset = (∅, ∅)
add(c, (A, T )) = (A ∪ {c}, T )
remove(c, (A, T )) = (A, T ∪ {c})
contents((A, T )) = A− T
Figure 11. A fragment of a courseware application.
to make sure that no bids are placed concurrently. Thus, the most
frequent operation of bid placement is the least expensive.
We now use our proof rule to show that the above consistency
choice is indeed sufficient to preserve the invariant I . Let
G0 = {((B,w), (B,w)) | (B,w) ∈ I};
G(τp) = {((B,⊥), (B′,⊥)) | B ⊂ B′};
G(τc) = {((B,⊥), (B,max(B))) | B 6= ∅}.
Then the condition S2 in Figure 5 is satisfied. We show how to
check the condition S3 in the most interesting case of o = place(b).
Consider σ = (B,w) and σ′ = (B′, w′) satisfying the premiss
of S3. Then σ ∈ I . Also, since
(σ, σ′) ∈ (G0 ∪G((F toko (σ))⊥))∗
and (F toko (σ))⊥ = {τp}, we get
w′ = w ∧B ⊆ B′ ∧ (w 6= ⊥ =⇒ B′ = B). (21)
If w 6= ⊥, then F effo (σ)(σ′) = σ′ and, by (21), σ = σ′. Since
σ ∈ I , we have
(σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) = (σ′, σ′) = (σ, σ) ∈ G0.
This implies the conclusion of S3.
If w = ⊥, then F effo (σ)(σ′) = (B′ ∪ {b}, w′). In this case (21)
implies w′ = w = ⊥. Thus,
(σ′,F effo (σ)(σ′)) = ((B′, w′), (B′ ∪ {b}, w′)) ∈ (G0 ∪G(τp)),
the desired conclusion of S3. Operationally, our proof rule estab-
lishes that, if the auction was open at the replica where the bid was
placed, then it will be open at any replica the bid is delivered to.
Similarly to our banking application (§4), we can deal with mul-
tiple auctions by using a pair of tokens (τc, τp) for every auction.


















Figure 12. Executions illustrating the need for (a) replicated data
types and (b) tokens in the courseware application.
6.2 Courseware
Our next example illustrates a different kind of an integrity invari-
ant and the use of replicated data types [40] to construct commu-
tative operations. Figure 11 shows a fragment of a courseware ap-
plication. We assume sets of courses Course and students Student.
A client can add a course c using addCourse(c) and register a stu-
dent s using register(s). A registered student s can be enrolled
into a course c using enroll(s, c). In the application fragment we
consider, student registrations and enrollments cannot be cancelled.
However, a course c that has not secured any student enrollment can
be removed using remCourse(c). As usual, we also have a query
operation.
A database state (S,C,E) consists of the set of students S, the
set of courses C and the enrollment relation E between students
and courses. The set of courses is actually not just an ordinary
set, but a replicated remove-wins set RWset(Course), explained
in the following. The effects of operations are mostly as expected,
with courses accessed using special functions add, remove and
contents on the replicated set. Note that the operation enroll(c, s)
takes effect only if the student s is registered and the course c exists.
The operation remCourse(c) removes the course c only when it
exists and has no students enrolled into it.
Using a replicated data type for the set of courses is needed to
satisfy (7), because additions to and removals from a usual set do
not commute. To illustrate, consider the execution in Figure 12(a).
There Alice adds a course on Java and then changes her mind and
removes the course; concurrently, Bob adds the same Java course. If
we maintained the information about courses using a usual set, then
the outcome of the query in the figure would depend on the order
in which we evaluate the effects of the causally independent op-
erations addCourse(Java) and remCourse(Java): the query would
return ∅ if the addition was evaluated before removal, and {Java}
otherwise (see Definition 2). In an actual database, implementing
the operations using ordinary sets would violate the replica conver-
gence property (§2.1).
Replicated data types [40] provide implementations of opera-
tions on data structures with commutative effects. They differ in the
way in which they resolve conflicting updates to the data structure,
such as those in Figure 12(a): when using an add-wins set, the query
in the figure will return {Java}, and when using a remove-wins set,
∅ [39]. The decision which data type to use ultimately depends on
application requirements. To keep presentation manageable, in our
example we use one of the simplest set data types, which provides
a rudimentary version of the remove-wins semantics.
The data type represents the replicated set of courses using
a pair of sets (A, T ). The function add(c, ·) puts c into the set
of A, and the function remove(c, ·) puts c into the set T , called
the tombstone set. To get the contents of the replicated set, we
just take the difference of A and T . The functions add(c, ·) and
remove(c, ·) commute: even if the removal is evaluated first, it will
still cancel the subsequent addition1. This ensures that the effects
of all operations in Figure 11 commute and thus satisfy (7).
The integrity invariant I we would like to maintain in this appli-
cation is that the enrollment relation refers to existing courses and
students only. This property is an instance of referential integrity,
which requires an object referenced in one part of the database to
exist in another. Without using tokens, the operations in our appli-
cation can break the invariant. This is illustrated by the execution
in Figure 12(b). There a Java course initially has no students en-
rolled. Then Alice removes the course and concurrently Bob enrolls
Carol into it, thinking that the course is still available. This results
in Carol being enrolled into a non-existent course.
To ensure that such situations do not happen, we use a pair
of conflicting tokens for each course c ∈ Course: τe(c) and
τr(c). The operation enroll(s, c) acquires τe(c), and the operation
remCourse(c) acquires τr(c). Then for every pair of operations
enroll(s, c) and remCourse(c), either the enrollment operation is
aware that the course has been removed, or the removal is aware
that there are still students enrolled into the course; in either case
the corresponding operation takes no effect. However, other pairs
of operations can be causally independent and, hence, do not have
to synchronise. This includes pairs of operations enrolling students
into courses and pairs of operations manipulating courses, such as
those in Figure 12(a). The above use of tokens is equivalent to as-
sociating every course with a multi-level lock [9] that can be in one
of two modes, one of which allows enrolling students into a course
(τe(c)) and the other removing the course (τr(c)). Unlike in the auc-
tion application above, neither of the tokens τe(c) or τr(c) conflicts
with itself, and thus, neither of the above lock modes is exclusive.
Our proof rule can establish that the above consistency choice is
sufficient to preserve the integrity invariant. To this end, we use the
following guarantees, associating changes with tokens as expected:
G0 = (I × I) ∩ {((S,C,E), (S′, C′, E)) |
S ⊆ S′ ∧ contents(C) ⊆ contents(C′)};
G(τe(c)) = (I × I) ∩ {((S,C,E), (S,C,E′)) |
∃s. E′ = E ] {(s, c)}};
G(τr(c)) = (I × I) ∩ {((S,C,E), (S,C′, E)) |
contents(C) = contents(C′) ] {c}}.
The actual proof is similar to that of the auction application above
and is omitted.
6.3 Parallel snapshot isolation
We show that our consistency model can be instantiated to capture
parallel snapshot isolation (PSI), a consistency model recently
proposed for replicated databases [38, 42] which takes a different
approach to strengthening consistency from the models we have
considered so far. We then give a proof rule specific to PSI.
We assume that the database consists of a finite set Obj of ob-
jects, ranged over by x, y. The objects store values from a set Val,
so that we let State = Obj→ Val. Operations in PSI perform com-
putations that read and write objects, and any two operations writ-
ing to the same object acquire conflicting tokens. Thus, by (8) up-
dates to the same object can never be concurrent, and the program-
mer does not have to merge them explicitly. However, PSI does
not provide strong consistency, since it allows updates to different
objects to be concurrent. For example, PSI allows the outcome in
Figure 2(b) when the operations add(postA) and add(postB) write
to different objects, e.g., representing the feeds of different users.
1 In fact, once an element was removed, it can never be successfully added
again, which may not be a desirable behaviour. There are replicated sets that
provide a more sophisticated semantics [39].
∃G ∈ P(State× State) such that
PSI1. σinit ∈ I
PSI2. G(I) ⊆ I
PSI3. ∀o, σ, σ′. (σ ∈ I ∧ (σ, σ′) ∈ (G ∩ (=
dom(Supdateso (σ))
))∗)
=⇒ (σ′,F effS,o(σ)(σ′)) ∈ G
PSIExec(S) ⊆ eval−1FS (I)
Figure 13. Proof rule for PSI. For a set of objects Ω, we define the
relation (=Ω) of type State× State as follows: for all states σ, σ′,
σ =Ω σ
′ iff ∀x ∈ Ω. σ(x) = σ′(x).
To represent PSI in our framework, we consider a token system
TPSI = (Token, ./), that associates every object x with a mutual
exclusion token τx:
Token = {τx | x ∈ Obj}; τx ./ τy ⇐⇒ x = y.
To define the semantics of operations o ∈ Op, we assume a
function
S ∈ Op→ (State→ Val× (Obj⇀ Val))
and let
∀o, σ. So(σ) = (Svalo (σ),Supdateso (σ)).
Thus, Svalo (σ) gives the return value of an operation o executed in
a state σ, and Supdateso (σ) gives the values that o writes to objects.
We lift S to a function FS of the type (6) as follows:
FS,o(σ) = (Svalo (σ),
(λσ′. λx. if x ∈ dom(S) then S(x) else σ′(x)),
{τx | x ∈ dom(S)}),
where S = Supdateso (σ). Thus, the effect of an operation o is limited
to writing the values specified by So; this is unlike the general
case of our consistency model, which allows arbitrary effects. The
acquired tokens are those for the objects written according to So.
Note that the effect specified by FS,o(σ) changes only the values
of the objects written to by the operation, but the converse is not
true: an operation can write to an object the same value it originally
stored. This will still trigger token acquisitions and, hence, create
causality relationships with other operations writing to the same
object.
PROPOSITION 9. For any S, the function FS satisfies (7).
The proof is given in [26, §A]. Note that FS does not always
satisfy (4): the flexibility allowed by (7) is crucial to represent PSI
as an instance of our generic consistency model.
We write PSIExec(S) = {X | X |= TPSI,FS} for the set
of all PSI executions with operation semantics given by S. It is
easy to show that this definition is equivalent to a recently-proposed
declarative definition of PSI [17].
Figure 13 gives a proof rule for checking that operations S
preserve an integrity invariant I when executed on PSI. The rule
requires us to specify the changes performed by all operations
using a single guarantee G, which has to preserve I (condition
PSI2). Condition PSI3 then requires us to check that the effect of
an operation o generated in a state σ ∈ I satisfies the guarantee
when applied to another state σ′. This state σ′ can be assumed
to result from σ by a finite number of changes allowed by the
guarantee G that do not modify the objects written by the operation
o. Intuitively, the latter constraint comes from the fact that such
operations acquire tokens conflicting with those of o.
THEOREM 10. The rule in Figure 13 is sound.
∃G0 ∈ P(State× State), G ∈ Token→ P(State× State)
such that
T1. σinit ∈ I
T2. G0(I) ⊆ I ∧ ∀τ. G(τ)(I) ⊆ I
T3. ∀o. ∃T.∃P1, . . . , Pn, Q1, . . . , Qn ∈ P(State).
T3a. T =
⋂




T3c. ∀i = 1..n. Pi ⊆ Qi ∧
T3d. (G0 ∪G(T⊥))(Qi) ⊆ Qi ∧
T3e. (Qi × (F effo (Pi)(Qi))) ⊆ (G0 ∪G(T ))
Exec(T ,F) ⊆ eval−1F (I)
Figure 14. Proof rule used by our tool. We assume a token system
T = (Token, ./) and use the same notation as in Figure 5. We let
F effo (Pi)(Qi) = {F effo (σ)(σ′) | σ ∈ Pi ∧ σ′ ∈ Qi}.
The proof, given in [26, §A], derives the rule for PSI directly
from the event-based rule in Figure 8. We could derive the rule
for PSI from a generalisation of the state-based rule in Figure 5
that associates guarantees with sets of tokens. However, to simplify
presentation we opted for the simpler version of the state-based rule
at the expense of a more complex derivation of the rule for PSI.
6.4 Automation
Our tool uses the proof rule in Figure 14, which is derived from
the one in Figure 5 and is more amenable to automation. The
premisses T1 and T2 are identical to S1 and S2; T3 changes S3
in two ways. A minor change is motivated by the fact that our
tool currently handles only operations that acquire the same set
of tokens regardless of the state they are executed in. Hence, T3
precomputes the set of tokens T acquired by an operation o (T3a).
The key way in which T3 changes S3 is that it eliminates the
transitive closure of the guarantees, which is hard to automate.
Whereas S3 quantifies over states σ where the effect of an operation
o is generated and σ′ where it is applied, T3 considers properties
of these states, respectively denoted by predicates Pi and Qi, i =
1..n. T3b requires the predicates Pi to cover all possible states in
which o can be executed. T3c requiresQi to cover Pi, reflecting the
fact that the effect of o can be applied in a state different from the
one where it was generated. T3d requires Qi to be stable under the
changes allowed by the guarantees [27]. Finally, T3e checks that if
an effect of o is generated in a state satisfying Pi, then applying this
effect to a state satisfyingQi is consistent with the guarantees. Note
that the constraints T3c and T3d have the same effect as relating the
states σ and σ′ in S3 by a transitive closure of guarantees.
For example, consider the operation o = withdraw(a) from
the banking application in Figure 4. We let T = {τ} and use the
guarantees (12). We use two predicates:
P1 = {σ | σ ≥ a}; P2 = {σ | 0 ≤ σ < a}.
These are motivated by the condition of the if-then-else in F effo , as
well as the invariant I . We then letQ1 = P1 andQ2 = I . It is easy
to check that the obligations in T3 are fulfilled.
Our tool accepts as input a token system T , the semantics of
operations F and an integrity invariant I , the latter two in the
SMT-LIB format (we leave a programming language for writing
operations as future work). The tool generates predicates Pi from
preconditions of branches in F . As Qi, the tool takes either Pi
or the invariant I . Finally, the tool generates guarantees G0 and
G by intersecting the semantics of operations F with the invari-
ant I . The required obligations are then discharged using the Z3
SMT solver [1]. Currently our tool assumes that the condition (7)
of operation commutativity is fulfilled: checking commutativity au-
tomatically is nontrivial [28].
Applications verified. The applications verified using our tool
(Figure 9) are more realistic versions of the examples we discussed
before (Figures 4, 10 and 11).
The banking application extends the one in Figure 4 by con-
sidering multiple accounts and allowing clients to transfer money
between accounts. We preserve the non-negativity of all balances
by associating a mutual exclusion token with each account, as de-
scribed in §4.
The auction application extends the one in Figure 10 by addi-
tionally maintaining information about buyers, sellers and prod-
ucts, and by allowing clients to sell multiple product items in a
single auction. Buyers and sellers can register and unregister. Reg-
istered buyers can bid in open auctions, and registered sellers can
add products, create auctions consisting of these and close auctions.
The complex data model of this application requires multiple in-
tegrity invariants, including referential integrity constraints span-
ning multiple parts of the database. This makes it nontrivial to see
if enough synchronisation has been added to the application to pre-
serve these invariants, and our tool copes with this task.
The courseware application extends the one in Figure 11 by
allowing clients to cancel student registrations and enrollments. It
also imposes an additional integrity invariant limiting the number
of students that can register for a course; maintaining this invariant
requires extra synchronisation.
The above case studies demonstrate the feasibility of applying
our proof rule to realistic applications.
7. Related Work
Reasoning in strongly consistent shared memory. Our state-
based proof rule interprets tokens as permissions to perform certain
state changes. Such interpretations have been used in various logics
for strongly consistent shared memory [20, 21, 36]. For example,
such a logic could allow threads to modify the memory in a partic-
ular way only when holding a mutual exclusion lock, similar to our
use of a token in the banking application (§4).
This similarity suggests that existing work in shared memory
may be helpful in exploring the novel area of replicated databases.
However, the distributed and weakly consistent setting in which
our proof rule is applied makes the reasons for its soundness sub-
tle. In this setting, we do not have an illusion of a single copy of the
database state and a global notion of time this copy would evolve
with: as Figure 1(b) illustrates, different processes can see events as
occurring in different orders. The usual justification for the sound-
ness of the proof rules for strong consistency relies on the con-
cepts of global time and state: when considering a thread holding a
mutex lock, such proof rules reason that no other thread can hold
the lock at the same time and, hence, modify the memory state in
the way associated with the lock. In this setting, locks constrain
the global order on events. In contrast, tokens in our consistency
model provide a more subtle guarantee (8), only constraining the
partial happens-before relation.
Reasoning about consistency in distributed systems and
databases. Several papers have considered reasoning about cor-
rectness properties on weak consistency models of replicated and
centralised databases.
Bailis et al. [7] have proposed a criterion for checking when an
integrity invariant is preserved by running operations without using
any synchronisation at all. But they do not provide guidelines on
how to introduce synchronisation if the invariant is violated.
Li et al. [31, 32] have proposed a static analysis that uses the
proof rule (11) to check if executing operations on causal con-
sistency preserves a given integrity invariant. In case when (11)
fails for some operation o, the analysis suggests to execute o under
strong consistency in the RedBlue consistency model (§3). How-
ever, the analysis does not check that the result will indeed validate
the invariant, and our proof rule fills this gap.
Sivaramakrishnan et al. [41] have proposed a static analysis that
automatically chooses consistency levels in a replicated database
given programmer-supplied contracts. However, these contracts are
more low-level than our invariants, since they typically constrain
the happens-before relation. For example, in the banking applica-
tion (Figure 4) their contract requires happens-before to totally or-
der all withdrawal operations. The static analysis then ensures that
the contract is followed, but not that it ensures the integrity invari-
ant (5).
Lu et al. [34] proposed proof rules for establishing correctness
properties of transactions running on non-hybrid weak consistency
models of classical relational databases, such as snapshot isola-
tion [12]. In contrast, we concentrate on hybrid consistency models
of modern replicated databases, which are more sophisticated.
Fekete [22] considered a hybrid consistency model for relational
databases where some transactions execute under snapshot isola-
tion [12] and some under serialisability, a form of strong consis-
tency. He proposed conditions determining which transactions in
an application need to execute under serialisability for the whole
application to be robust, i.e., produce only behaviours that would be
obtained by executing all transactions under serialisability. In con-
trast, our proof rule only checks integrity invariants while allow-
ing the application to produce weakly consistent behaviours and,
hence, benefit from the resulting performance gains.
Weak memory models. Strong consistency is forgone not only
by modern databases, but also by shared-memory multiprocessors
and programming languages, which provide weak memory models.
All such models used in practice are hybrid, in that they allow
the programmer to strengthen consistency on demand, e.g., using
memory fences. However, weak memory models usually provide
only a limited number of operations on data, such as reads, writes
and compare-and-swaps on single memory cells. Concurrent writes
to the same memory cell result in one value being overwritten by
the other. In contrast, we deal with arbitrary operations (6) that
merge concurrent updates in a user-defined way.
That said, in the future there may be a fruitful exchange of ideas
between program logics for applications using weakly consistent
databases and those running on weak memory models. In particular,
there have been recent proposals of program logics for the “release-
acquire” fragment of the C/C++ memory model [45, 46]. This frag-
ment is analogous to causal consistency, with the above caveats
about the allowed operations. However, the published logics do not
meaningfully handle operations requesting the stronger “sequen-
tially consistent” level of C/C++. Reasoning about on-demand re-
quests of stronger-than-causal consistency is precisely the goal of
the present paper.
Several papers [3–5, 13, 18, 19] have verified application cor-
rectness on weak memory models using model checkers and
abstract interpreters. These papers thus explore verification ap-
proaches different from the one considered in this paper. Addi-
tionally, most of the papers have focussed on models similar to
TSO [3, 13, 18, 19], which is stronger than the causal consistency
model we consider as a baseline. As the target correctness property,
papers on weak memory models have often considered robustness
(see above), which is too strong a requirement for our setting. On
the other hand, some of the papers [3, 4, 13, 19] automatically in-
ferred fences required to satisfy a correctness property. We do not
address the inference of consistency choices, although in the future
our state-based proof rule can serve as a basis for this.
Consistency models. Our conflict relations are similar to those
used by Pedone and Schiper [37] to specify constraints on message
delivery in a broadcast algorithm. We use the conflict relations
to define a high-level consistency model, which abstracts from a
message-based database implementation.
In a position paper, Li et al. [30] independently proposed an
idea of a hybrid consistency model similar to ours. Their model
does not have a formal semantics and is less flexible than ours,
since their analogue of the conflict relation is defined directly on
operations, instead of indirectly using tokens. This does not allow
the synchronisation mandated for an operation to depend on the
state it is executed in and, hence, does not allow expressing parallel
snapshot isolation (§6).
Specifying consistency models. The formal specification of our
consistency model (§3) builds on a framework previously proposed
to specify forms of eventual consistency [15]. Despite this simi-
larity, we take a somewhat different approach to specifying the se-
mantics of operations. Previous work [15] specified the return value
of an event by an arbitrary function of its context in the execution
(§3). In contrast, our Definition 2 uses a particular function eval†F ,
itself constructed from more primitive functions F effo , operating on
states. This choice allows us to define the semantics of operations in
terms of states, as opposed to events, which can then be used in our
state-based proof rule. The use of states also allows to use off-the-
shelf SMT solvers to discharge the required verification conditions.
However, it is likely that our event-based rule may be adapted to the
operation specifications used in [15].
8. Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the first proof rule establishing that a given consis-
tency choice in a replicated database is sufficient to preserve a given
integrity invariant. Our proof rule is modular and simple to use. We
demonstrated this by small but nontrivial examples, and by reduc-
ing the verification conditions of the proof rule to SMT checks. De-
spite this simplicity, the soundness of our proof rule is nontrivial:
the rule fully exploits the guarantees provided by our consistency
model while correctly accounting for anomalies it allows.
Our results represent only an initial step in building an infras-
tructure of reasoning methods for applications using modern repli-
cated databases. They open several avenues for future work. First,
our generic consistency model is not implemented by any database
in its full generality; we use it only as a means to compactly rep-
resent a selection of more specific models in existing implementa-
tions. However, in the future the generic model can serve as a basis
for exploring the space of possible hybrid consistency models. One
could also consider a database that implements our model in its
general form.
Second, the soundness of our proof rule relies on the fact that
our consistency model guarantees at least causal consistency (§4).
Even though causal consistency can be implemented without any
synchronisation between replicas, this model has its cost [14]. In
the future, we plan to propose proof rules for weaker models where
causality preservation is not guaranteed for all operations. We also
hope to generalise our methods to more expressive correctness
properties than integrity invariants.
Third, in this paper we used the event-based proof rule just to
structure the proof of soundness of the state-based one. However,
the event-based rule is also interesting in its own right. In the future
it can be used in cases when, to prove a correctness property,
we need to maintain information about the computation history.
For example, this is often necessary when reasoning about shared-
memory concurrency [23, 25].
Finally, we have concentrated on checking that a particular
choice of a conflict relation and tokens acquired by operations is
sufficient to preserve a given integrity invariant. We hope that in
the future our state-based proof rule can serve as a basis for tools
that infer these parameters automatically. In particular, the proof in
Figure 6 can be used to refine a given conflict relation: when the
stability check T3d fails, the relation can be extended to so as to
shrink the set G(T⊥) and make the check pass.
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